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  Since the birth of the modern employment relationship a few centuries ago, employers 
have struggled with how to reward and motivate employees. Contemporary information 
technologies, global competitive pressures, and demographic changes have heightened these 
struggles as the employment relationship is increasingly characterized by contingencies rather 
than stability (Cappelli, 1999). Against this backdrop, shared capitalism compensation plans seek 
to motivate employees by tying their pay to various measures of organizational and employee 
performance (Gates, 1998; Freeman, 2001; Conyon and Freeman, 2004; Kruse, Freeman, and 
Blasi, 2006). But shared capitalism will likely only be successful in motivating employees if 
employees know about and understand such plans, especially the extent to which they are 
individually covered by forms of shared capitalism. In other words, incentives that are unknown 
to employees are unlikely to affect their behavior. 
  We know that in general, knowledge is often imperfect. Various Gallup polls leave little 
doubt of this fact.
1 In a 2005 poll, 29 percent of Americans indicated that they believe that both 
evolution and creationism are probably true, in spite of the contradictory nature of these two 
theories. On the 60th anniversary of D-Day, 35 percent could not identify Germany as the Allied 
forces’ D-Day enemy. More than 50 percent of Americans cannot identify the first 10 
amendments to the Constitution as the “Bill of Rights.” A large majority of American admit that 
they know very little about the European Union, including 80 percent who don’t know that it has 
a larger population than the United States. And 18 percent incorrectly believe the sun revolves 
around the earth. With respect to economic knowledge, only 34 percent of adults managed to get  
                                                 
1 The polls cited here are dated August 5-7, 2005, May 21-23, 2004, August 28-September 15, 
2003, and June 25-27, 1999.  
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an “A” or “B” on a basic economics quiz done by the National Council on Economic Education 
in 2005 (Markow and Bagnaschi, 2005). 
  As will be shown in the next section, previous research has also uncovered significant 
amounts of ignorance in the employment relationship, specifically pertaining to employees’ 
imperfect understanding of privately- and publicly-provided benefits. As such, it is reasonable to 
hypothesize that some employees are ignorant about shared capitalism compensation programs. 
To test this hypothesis, this paper analyzes over 20,000 employee surveys linked to employer-
provided shared capitalism coverage information from 10-14 private sector companies collected 
under the NBER Shared Capitalism research project. Consistent with the literature on other 
aspects of the employment relationship, significant levels of misunderstanding and inaccuracy 
are uncovered. Employee ignorance might very well undermine shared capitalism. 
Research on Employee Ignorance 
Previous research shows that employee ignorance of privately- and publicly-provided 
employee benefits is not a trivial concern. For example, the 1998 British Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey (WERS98) contains manager-provided indications regarding whether several 
family-friendly benefits are available in the workplace along with individual-provided responses 
on whether the employee thinks these benefits are available to him or her. Among workplaces 
with a family-friendly benefit (according to the manager), large fractions of employees do not 
indicate that this benefit is personally available to them. For example, even after trying to control 
for imperfect workplace coverage, only one-quarter of employees in workplaces with parental 
leave benefits correctly perceive that they are entitled to parental leave. The analogous fractions 
for job sharing arrangements and employer-subsidized child care benefits are one-quarter and  
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one-fifth, respectively. In other words, there appears to be a significant discrepancy between 
availability and awareness (Budd and Mumford, 2004, 2006). 
Several studies of retirement benefits provide additional documentation of employee 
ignorance of privately-provided benefits. Mitchell (1988: 35) matched survey responses for over 
600 workers to administrative pension plan data and found that “pension misinformation and 
missing information are quite widespread.” Luchak and Gunderson (2000) surveyed employees 
of a large public utility and found moderate levels of pension knowledge—employees responded 
correctly to seven questions about their pensions about half of the time. Only 28 percent of the 
employees accurately knew the formula used to calculate benefit amounts and only 36 percent 
could identify one of the eligibility requirements for retiring early. Analyses of individuals in the 
University of Michigan Health and Retirement Study also uncover significant levels of pension 
ignorance (Chan and Stevens, 2004; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005). For example, one-third of 
the respondents are not able to provide enough information to construct any estimate of their 
pension’s present value; among those providing enough information, only half estimate their 
pension’s present value within a factor of two (Chan and Stevens, 2004). An imperfect 
understanding of how 401(k) retirement plans work is illustrated by Choi, Laibson, and 
Madrian’s (2005) finding that half of vested employees aged 59½ years and older at seven firms 
with employer matching policies fail to take advantage of this match even though this is 
essentially giving up free income because there are no tax penalties for these workers to 
immediately cash out these contributions. With respect to health insurance, Reschovsky, 
Hargraves, and Smith (2002) find that 25 percent of respondents cannot correctly identify 
whether they are covered by an HMO or non-HMO plan.  
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Turning to publicly-provided benefits, a phone survey in 1995 and another in 2000 
revealed that 40 percent of U.S. workers had not heard of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA) which was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1993; moreover, among those who had 
heard of the law, 50 percent were unsure as to whether they were personally eligible to use it 
(Budd and Brey, 2003; Waldfogel, 2001). Though not a publicly-provided benefit per se, there 
are also serious shortcomings in workers’ knowledge of the employment-at-will legal doctrine. 
For example, in the United States is it legal to fire someone to make room for another employee 
to do the same job at a lower wage, and also to fire someone who is mistakenly believed to have 
stolen money. But Kim (1997) documents that less than 20 percent of surveyed employees can 
correctly identify these scenarios as being legal. In separate surveys, Rudy (2002) and Freeman 
and Rogers (2006) similarly document extensive employee ignorance about the general lack of 
legal restrictions on firing workers. In two surveys of low-income workers in New York City, 
less than 20 percent could correctly identify the value of the minimum wage (Brennan Center for 
Justice, 2006). 
The imperfect use of publicly-provided social insurance programs is also partially 
attributed to imperfect knowledge of these programs. Twenty-five to forty percent of 
unemployed individuals eligible for unemployment insurance do not receive it (McCall, 1995). 
Budd and McCall (1997, 2004) find a significantly higher take-up rate among blue collar 
unionized workers relative to comparable nonunion workers and ascribe this, in part, to the role 
that unions provide in providing information and combating uncertainty and ignorance. Hirsch, 
Macpherson, and DuMond (1997) similarly attribute greater levels of workers’ compensation 
receipt among unionized workers, compared to similar nonunion individuals, at least partially to  
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union-provided information on workers’ compensation systems. That unions can play such a role 
indicates that employees are not fully aware of these types of employee benefits. 
In fact, issues of employee knowledge, ignorance, and usage of privately- and publicly-
provided benefits are important enough for Budd (2004) and Budd and Mumford (2004) to add a 
union facilitation face to Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) famous monopoly and voice faces of 
labor unions and for others to devote significant attention to how to make labor policies effective 
(e.g., Weil, 1996, 2005). A lack of perfect knowledge is also consistent with theories of bounded 
rationality in which time constraints and cognitive limitations prevent individuals from gathering 
and processing complete information (March and Simon, 1958; Simon, 1982). So employee 
ignorance of privately- and publicly-provided employee benefits is a meaningful concern and it 
is reasonable to hypothesize that similar issues apply to shared capitalism compensation plans. 
With that said, an important issue in much of this research is measuring employee 
coverage or eligibility. Typically, researchers have only an imperfect indicator of this key 
variable. Studies of publicly-provided benefits typically must impute eligibility from 
administrative eligibility criteria. Budd and Mumford’s (2004, 2006) studies of privately-
provided family-friendly benefits rely on matching employer information about whether a 
specific benefit is available for any employees in a workplace to employee responses about 
whether they personally could use this benefit. Similar issues are present in the analyses below in 
that the employer-provided information on coverage of shared capitalism programs might not be 
perfectly accurate for each individual employee. So while the previous literature supports the 
need to empirically examine the extent of employee ignorance of shared capitalism programs, it 
also reminds us to be careful as to how ignorance is measured.  
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Measuring Ignorance of Shared Capitalism Programs 
To analyze employees’ accurate knowledge or ignorance of their employers’ policies and 
programs requires two levels of data: company-provided reports pertaining to coverage or 
applicability and employee indications of awareness. As summarized in Figure 1, with these two 
sources of information, four outcomes are possible: the employee accurately responds that they 
are not covered by a policy, the employee accurately responds that they are covered by a policy, 
the employee indicates that they are not covered by or aware of a policy for which the company 
indicated that they are (employee ignorance), and the employee indicates that they are covered 
by a policy for which the company indicated that the policy is not offered by the employer 
generally or to that employee specifically (false positive). Frequently-analyzed surveys like the 
Current Population Survey that only contain individual-level data can only be used to measure 
employee awareness while organizational surveys just capture coverage rates. Linked employer-
employee data are required to assess employee accuracy and ignorance. 
The NBER Shared Capitalism data set contains linked employer-employee information 
on several shared capitalism programs and can therefore be used to analyze the accuracy and 
shortfalls of employees’ understanding of these programs. The NBER Shared Capitalism data set 
was collected by a research team directed by Joseph Blasi, Richard Freeman, and Doug Kruse 
that administered surveys to over 100,000 employees across 14 companies. The goal of this data 
collection effort was to allow the research team to analyze the effect of shared capitalism 
programs on workers and companies (e.g., Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi, 2006). Surveys were 
completed by 46,907 employees for an overall response rate of 45 percent, although the presence 
of missing values reduces the sample sizes used in the analyses below. The survey dates range 
from 2001 to 2006 with most of the surveys completed in 2005; 78 percent were completed by  
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employees working in the United States. Forty-four percent of the surveys were completed via 
the internet; the remainder were completed via a paper survey instrument. The organizations are 
all private sector manufacturing, services, technology, or finance-related companies that range in 
size from roughly 200 to 50,000 employees. The sample sizes and response rates across these 
organizations range from 200 to 32,000 and from 10 to 80 percent, respectively.  
While the companies represent different industries and sizes, they were targeted for 
inclusion because of their use of various shared capitalism programs. For example, nine of the 
companies have employee stock ownership plans. The companies are therefore not representative 
of the entire population of U.S. companies, but this is not a major concern for the analyses below 
because the focus here is on measuring employee ignorance in shared capitalism firms rather 
than on estimating coverage rates across the population. If anything, the results might be biased 
against employee ignorance to the extent that information about the plans of interest might be 
disseminated more widely in firms in which shared capitalism programs are prominent (as in the 
sampled firms) compared to companies in which they are not. 
The employee surveys ask questions pertaining to the respondent employee’s job, 
supervision, relations with co-workers, attitudes, and demographic characteristics. Of particular 
interest for this paper are a number of questions pertaining to participation in, and sometimes 
awareness of, various shared capitalism programs—performance-related pay, employee stock 
ownership, 401(k)s, deferred profit-sharing, stock options, and employee stock purchase plans. 
The applicability of these programs to sets of employees was determined through interviews with 
managers and from the companies’ Form 5500 filings with the Internal Revenue Service. In a 
majority of cases, the shared capitalism programs include or exclude all employees uniformly, 
but the performance-related pay plans sometimes vary across different groups of workers. For  
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example, one company reports that a profit-sharing plan only applies to managerial employees 
while another company reports that an individual bonus program excludes unionized employees. 
These types of variations in coverage are matched to the employee surveys using the employees’ 
self-reported job characteristics. Four of the smaller companies are omitted from some of the 
analyses below because employees were not directly asked about their perceived eligibility for 
performance-related pay. 
As shown in Figure 1, whenever an individual’s response to whether or not a specific 
shared capitalism program applies to them personally does not match the company-provided 
information for that employee, it is characterized here as an employee inaccuracy—either in the 
form of ignorance or a false positive. This assumes that the company-provided information is 
accurate for each individual employee. While the company responses are matched to each 
employee based on any job characteristics that the managers indicate determine coverage, it is 
useful to explicitly note that this falls short of the ideal situation in which employee-by-employee 
administrative data are available. As such, one cannot rule out the possibility that some 
employees have better information on the applicability of specific programs than are contained in 
these data. For example, a relatively new employee might be excluded from a program until after 
completing a probationary period. The multivariate analyses below will try to control for some of 
these possibilities by using job and demographic characteristics as control variables (see 
Appendix Table 1 for variable definitions and summary statistics), but ultimately the measures of 
employee inaccuracy may overstate the true extent of inaccuracy.  
Aggregate Shared Capitalism Ignorance Rates 
Table 1 presents aggregate coverage, perceived coverage, and ignorance rates for several 
shared capitalism programs. Profit-sharing plans are those in which pay or bonuses depend on  
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company profits or performance. Seven of the companies indicate that a profit-sharing plan 
applies to all employees, six have plans that apply to some employees, and one reported no such 
plan.
2 As shown in column 1 of Table 1, this means that according to their employer, 85 percent 
of employees are covered by a profit-sharing plan. Employees were separately asked if they were 
eligible for performance-related pay in which the size of the payments depended on company 
profits or performance; 70 percent of the employees perceived that they are covered by such a 
plan. Comparing this to the company-reported 85 percent coverage rate reveals a significant 
discrepancy. Moreover, this aggregate comparison understates the extent of mismatch because 
false positives can be offsetting ignorance (recall Figure 1). In fact, for profit-sharing plans, 25 
percent of the employee responses fail to match the company-reported response (see column 3 of 
Table 1). Columns 4 and 5 decompose these mismatches. Among the 38,829 employees that the 
companies say are covered by profit-sharing plans, 8,960 employees (23 percent) report that they 
are not covered. While there are other explanations, this is interpreted here as employee 
ignorance; approaching this from the other direction, column 4 implies that the remaining 77 
percent of employees are correctly aware that they are covered by a profit-sharing plan. Turning 
to column 5, among the 32,164 employees who perceive that they are covered by a profit-sharing 
plan, 2,295 of them are not covered according to their employer. In other words, seven percent of 
perceived coverage stems from false positives.  
                                                 
2 Three of the companies with universal applicability and the one company with no coverage are 
dropped from the analyses because employee-level coverage was imputed rather than asked 
directly. The next three measures in Table 1 were also imputed at the employee level for these 
same four companies so they are again dropped from the analyses. For gainsharing plans, all four 
reported no coverage. For individual-level performance pay, one reported uniform coverage, one 
no coverage, and two partial coverage. For all forms of performance pay, three of the dropped 
organizations have uniform coverage and one has no coverage.  
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The remaining rows of Table 1 repeat this exercise for other measures of shared 
capitalism. Only three percent of the employees are covered by gainsharing plans (pay-for-
performance based on team or group performance) according to the companies, but 21 percent of 
the employees believe their pay depends on team or group performance. Only half of the 
employees covered by such plans accurately report this coverage, and more than 90 percent of 
the employees’ affirmative responses are incorrect. A similar qualitative pattern is apparent for 
individual-based performance pay. Twenty percent of the observations are mismatched while 
more than one-third of individuals covered by an individual-based performance pay plan are 
unaware of this and one-third of the affirmative responses are false positives. These levels of 
misunderstanding might stem from explicit versus implicit views of performance-based pay such 
that companies report a lack of formal gainsharing or individual-based programs while 
employees nonetheless believe that their pay ultimately reflects team, group, or individual 
performance even in the absence of a formal, formulaic incentive program.  
The performance-based pay variable in the fourth row of Table 1 is coded as a yes if any 
of the previous three plans—profit-sharing, gainsharing, or individual-based plans—are coded as 
a yes. The level of ignorance and the rate of false positives are lower for this broader measure. 
So there is less disagreement between companies and their employees about performance-based 
pay generally. But if the specific nature of the a performance incentive is important, then one 
needs to remember that the first three rows in Table 1 reveal greater discrepancies between 
employees’ understanding of specific performance-based pay programs and their employers’ 
descriptions of these same programs. Moreover, the first two rows of Table 2 reveal other 
dimensions of employee ignorance about pay-for-performance programs. Twenty percent of the 
9,295 employees who did not indicate that they are eligible for performance-based pay actually  
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do not know if they are eligible. Of those who did not state that they earned performance-based 
pay last year, 8 percent do not know if they did so.  
Returning to Table 1, the fifth row presents the summary results for eight of the 
companies that have employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs).
3 As shown in column 1, these 
ESOPs apply uniformly to all employees in these organizations. Among the employees in these 
eight companies, 82 percent indicate that they participate in the ESOP while 18 percent indicate 
that they do not. Even though the question is worded as participation rather than coverage or 
eligibility, this 18 percent non-participation rate likely reflects a significant amount of ignorance. 
ESOPs rarely exclude large groups of employees except, in some cases, unionized employees 
and probationary employees. So setting these exclusions aside momentarily, lack of reported 
participation equates to lack of awareness. But what about these potential exclusions? None of 
the companies indicated that unionized employees are excluded and re-calculating the statistics 
in row 5 of Table 1 for nonunion employees only reduces the mismatch rate by less than one 
percentage point. Turning to probationary exclusions, the mismatch rate falls to 16 percent when 
employees with less than 6 months of tenure are excluded, and to 13 percent when those with 
less than one year of tenure are omitted. So perhaps the rate of ignorance for ESOPs is around 15 
percent (roughly). Also, row 3 of Table 2 shows that of the 798 self-reported non-participants, 32 
percent indicate that they don’t know if they participate in the ESOP.  
The Shared Capitalism data set contains several other measures of shared capitalism 
programs, but an analysis as in Table 1 is not appropriate because participation is voluntary and  
                                                 
3 A ninth ESOP company is excluded from the analyses because employees in this company 
were not asked if they participate in the ESOP.  
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employees were generally not asked about eligibility in the surveys. For example, of the 
employees eligible for 401(k) plans according to their employer, 16 percent indicate that they do 
not participate in a 401(k) plan. But this might reflect a choice not to participate rather than 
ignorance. There are, however, some questions about these programs that reveal a certain amount 
of employee ignorance (see Table 2). For example, among employees who fail to say that they 
participate in a 401(k) plan, 18 percent of them indicate that they do not know if they participate. 
Of those who did not indicate that they have ever received stock options, 14 percent responded 
that they do not know if they have ever received stock options. Uncertainty about exercising 
stock options, currently holding stock options, and buying company stock, however, is 
negligible.  
Predicting and Explaining Employee Ignorance 
Multivariate estimation can be used to assess the extent to which demographic, job, and 
company characteristics predict mismatches between employer and employee beliefs about the 
coverage of shared capitalism pay programs. Characteristics that are strong predictors of these 
mismatches might hold important clues to explaining the sources of inaccuracy and mismatch. 
To this end, Tables 3, 4, and 6 present probit results in which the indicators from columns 3-5 of 
Table 1 are the dependent variables: overall mismatches, employee ignorance, and false positives 
for each of the shared capitalism plans. The estimates reported in these tables are marginal 
effects, rather than probit coefficients, calculated using the standard algorithm: all of the 
variables are set to their sample mean values, and the marginal effects for continuous 
independent variables are calculated as the change in probability for a small change in the 
variable while the marginal effects for dummy variables are calculated as the change in 
probability associated with changing the dummy variable from zero to one. The standard errors  
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are robust to arbitrary forms of heteroskedasticity. The sample sizes are smaller than in Table 1 
because of missing observations for the independent variables, especially educational attainment. 
Sample means of the independent variables are reported in Appendix Table 1. 
Table 3 reports probit results for overall mismatches.
4 More specifically, the sample for 
each model includes all non-missing observations and the dependent variable equals one if the 
employer and employee responses for the particular shared capitalism do not agree. In terms of 
Figure 1, all four interior cells are used and the dependent variable indicates observations that 
fall into the two inaccurate cells. These models therefore pool both ignorance and false positives. 
Column 1 reports the results for profit-sharing plans. Recall from Table 1 that 24.6 percent of the 
responses are mismatches. Compared to high school dropouts, employees who graduated from 
high school or attended college are significantly less likely to erroneously report profit-sharing 
coverage. Women, married individuals, higher-paid employees, employees who expect to work 
at the employer for a long time, and U.S. employees are also less likely to be mismatched. Age 
and tenure both exhibit a quadratic relationship with the probability of mismatch; increases in 
each of these measures reduces the predicted probability of a mismatch up to 33 years of age and 
19 years of tenure. Sales employees are much more likely to erroneously report whether they are 
covered by a profit-sharing plan as are unionized employees.  
Turning to gainsharing plans (column 2), women and U.S. employees are again less 
likely to have a mismatch with their employers’ responses and tenure has a similar quadratic 
relationship. Higher paid employees, those who expect to work at their employer for a long time,  
                                                 
4 Tables 3 and 6 do not include results for ESOPs because there are no false positives; as such, 
the overall mismatch results reduce to the employee ignorance results reported in Table 4.  
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sales occupations, and non-white individuals are predicted to have a higher a likelihood of an 
erroneous response; as will be shown in Table 6 these results apparently stem from these 
employees overstating the frequency of gainsharing plans. With respect to individually-based 
performance pay plans (column 3), those who are estimated as being associated with a lower 
probability of a mismatched report are non-white, higher-paid, and U.S. employees and those 
who work in larger companies. In contrast to the other types of performance-based plans, 
increases in tenure are associated with a greater likelihood of a mismatched response. But 
looking at performance-based pay overall (column 4), age and tenure both reduce the likelihood 
of erroneous responses (at least up to the inflection points of 44 and 18 years, respectively). 
Higher paid, sales, and U.S. employees are less likely to improperly assess whether or not they 
are covered by any type of performance-based pay whereas the opposite is true of hourly and 
unionized workers. 
The results for company size and unionization merit a special note. These two variables 
are included in the results here because one would expect that unionization and company size 
can affect the quality and quantity of employee information. But recall that the NBER Shared 
Capitalism data set consists of employees from 14 companies, and four of these are not used here 
because the eligibility questions for performance-related pay were imputed. As such, the results 
are based on only 10 companies. All of the unionized employees are concentrated in three of 
these companies. And the variable on total employment only takes on 10 distinct values (one 
value for each company). As such, it is difficult to distinguish these variables from company-
specific effects and unlike for the other variables in these models, the results for unionization and 
company size are not robust to the inclusion of company-specific effects. So the results for these 
two variables are presented here with caution.  
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Table 4 presents the probit results for employee ignorance. In these models, the samples 
are restricted to individuals for which the company indicates they are covered by the relevant 
shared capitalism program. The dependent variable equals one if the employee does not perceive 
him or herself as being covered. In other words, the dependent variable indicates those 
individuals I am labeling as ignorant or unaware. In terms of Figure 1, these models are limited 
to the second column and estimate the probability of being in the top cell (employee ignorance) 
in this column. Negative coefficients indicate a reduced likelihood of ignorance or lack of 
awareness. None of the predictors are consistent across all of the shared capitalism plans, but 
some patterns appear to hold across two or three plans. Greater educational attainment generally 
reduces employee ignorance as do higher earnings and expectations of working at the employer 
for a long time. Hourly employees are more likely to fail to recognize coverage by a 
performance-based pay plan relative to salaried employees as are unionized employees except 
for the case of gainsharing plans. Sales employees are more likely to be unaware of company-
level profit-sharing plans but, not surprisingly, are less likely to be ignorant of individual-based 
incentives. Age and tenure exhibit quadratic relationships with the probability of ignorance, 
though increasing the quantities increases rather than decreases ignorance pertaining to 
individual-level performance pay plans. The overall results for ignorance about ESOPs appear 
generally similar as for the performance-based pay plans.  
As the results for each variable tend to vary from program to program, an alternative way 
to approach these results is to ask what each model as a whole implies for the predicted 
probability of employee ignorance across different profiles of employees. For example, the 
results in column 1 of Table 4 predict that the probability of being ignorant about the existence 
of a profit-sharing plan is 62 percent for a single, 21 year-old, non-white, high school dropout  
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father of two making $25,000 per year with no expectation of working for a long time for his 200 
employee company of one year in a union-represented, non-sales, hourly job in the United 
States. In contrast to this less-educated, low-paid, young worker profile, consider a better-
educated, salaried, experienced worker profile: a married, 45 year-old, white, college-educated, 
childless woman making $75,000 per year with expectations of working for a long time in her 
200 person company of 15 years in a nonunion, non-sales, salaried job in the United States only 
has a 4 percent chance of failing to correctly realize that she is covered by a profit-sharing plan. 
Table 5 summarizes these predictions for the various shared capitalism plans. The pattern of 
results are quite similar with the exception of the gainsharing results—younger, inexperienced, 
low-educated, and low-paid employees are significantly more likely to be unaware of shared 
capitalism programs than their middle-aged, higher paid, better educated, salaried counterparts.  
Besides ignorance or lack of awareness, the second dimension of employer-employee 
mismatches consists of false positive responses—situations in which employees’ perception that 
they are covered by a shared capitalism program contradicts their employers’ statements that 
they are not. Table 6 presents the probit results for false positives. In these models, the samples 
are restricted to individuals who indicated that they are covered by the relevant shared capitalism 
program and the dependent variable equals one if the company did not indicate that this 
employee was covered. In terms of Figure 1, these models are limited to the second row and 
estimate the probability of being in the left-most cell (false positives) in this row. The results are 
mixed and job characteristics seem more consistently important than demographic characteristics 
for explaining false positives. This suggests that variations in false positive responses stem more 
from variations in employer offerings of shared capitalism plans than from variations in 
employee beliefs about their prevalence. In other words, employees in jobs that are less likely to  
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have a pay-for-performance plan are more likely to make a false positive error. Except for the 
case of gainsharing programs, higher paid employees are less likely to make a false positive error 
whereas hourly and unionized employees are more likely to make this mistake. Table 7 repeats 
the exercise of Table 5 in presenting the predicted probabilities of a false positive for two 
different employee profiles. Younger, inexperienced, low-educated, and low-paid employees are 
significantly more likely to misunderstand the applicability of company and individual-based 
performance pay plans than their middle-aged, higher paid, better educated, salaried co-workers.  
Other Measures of Shared Capitalism Ignorance 
The primary focus of this paper is trying to assess the extent of employee ignorance about 
shared capitalism programs by analyzing mismatches between employer and employee 
statements pertaining to the applicability of three pay-for-performance plans plus ESOP plans. 
However, there are several other questions in the NBER Shared Capitalism data set that can be 
used to examine the importance of employee ignorance for potentially undermining employee 
involvement in decision-making. The responses to six relevant questions are summarized in 
Table 8. Nearly 30 percent of employees at three companies believe that their company only 
occasionally or never reaches out to them to provide them with information about company goals 
and workplace changes; nearly 45 percent at two companies report that they personally seek out 
such information on their own only occasionally or never. A quarter of employees at one large 
company failed to agreed with the statement that they have the information needed to their job; 
around 40 percent failed to agree with the statements that they are kept abreast of important 
issues in the organization and in their jobs. And 15 percent of employees across seven companies 
believe that they understand their company’s plan for being successful only a little or not at all.   
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To the extent that shared capitalism programs aim to provide workers with incentives for 
making better decisions, these questions are relevant to the understanding of such programs. 
More specifically, the responses to these six questions reveal non-trivial numbers of employees 
who believe that they have insufficient information and are not kept up-to-date on important 
changes. As nearly all of these questions were asked in only one or two companies, additional 
research needs to assess generalizability of the responses, but the pattern of results is suggestive 
of employee ignorance that can undermine shared capitalism programs by creating roadblocks to 
informed decision making. This is another dimension of employee ignorance that should not be 
overlooked. 
The Impact of Ignorance 
Space considerations prevent a comprehensive analysis in this paper of the effect of 
ignorance on the operation of shared capitalism programs. But the employee mismatches 
documented here are a form of a measurement error that can affect econometric estimates of the 
effect of shared capitalism on various outcomes. The NBER Shared Capitalism data do not 
contain performance measures per se, but consider two questions that are perhaps related to 
individual employee performance: willingness to work hard and loyalty. For the former, 
employees were asked to respond on a 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree scale to the 
statement “I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the company I work for 
succeed.” There is widespread agreement with this statement with a mean response of 4.02 and a 
standard deviation of 0.899. For the latter, employees were asked “How much loyalty would you 
say you feel toward the company you work for as a whole?” with response choices of 1=no  
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loyalty at all, 2=only a little, 3=some, 4=a lot.
5 The average response to this question is 3.33 with 
a standard deviation of 0.798. 
One might expect that if shared capitalism programs are effective that they would 
improve workers’ willingness to work hard and their loyalty toward their employers. Columns 1 
and 3 of Table 9 show that in regressions with and without additional control variables similar to 
those in the probit models, employees who believe they are covered by any performance-based 
pay plan have higher levels of willingness to work hard and loyalty. These are the type of 
regression models that one might estimate in these data ignoring issues of mismatch and 
ignorance. But again, these effects might be biased because of measurement error associated 
with mismatch and ignorance. Columns 2 and 4 therefore include separate indicators for three 
cells of Figure 1: accurate yeses, employee ignorance, and false positives; accurate no’s are the 
omitted reference category. With the exception of the loyalty model with control variables, the 
effect size for accurate yes is always larger than the estimates in columns 1 and 2. In most of the 
cases, the employee ignorance estimate is smaller than the accurate yes estimate, though 
surprisingly individuals who are labeled as ignorant about performance-based pay are estimated 
to have higher levels of willingness to work hard and loyalty than individuals in the accurate no 
category. The false positive employees have the largest effects in many cases which is consistent 
with them acting as if they were covered by performance-based pay plans even though they may 
or may not be in reality. In sum, the overall pattern of results in Table 9 is consistent with 
information being important, including the existence of measurement error in the econometric 
                                                 
5 In actuality, the response scales of both of these questions in the original data collection were 
the opposite of what are presented here, but I have reverse-coded them so that higher numerical 
responses indicate higher levels of willingness to work hard and loyalty.  
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models and also with the potential for shared capitalism programs to be more effective when 
employees and employers have good information.  
Conclusions 
An analysis of the NBER Shared Capitalism data set of thousands of employee responses 
linked to company-provided information from 10-14 private-sector organizations reveals 
significant fractions of employees whose perceptions of whether or not they are covered by 
various shared capitalism programs do not match their employers’ policies. In fact, between 18 
and 25 percent of the employee responses on the perceived coverage of company, group, and 
individual-level incentive pay plans and of ESOPs disagree with the employer-provided 
coverage information. There is a particularly large discrepancy between employee and employer 
understandings of group or team-level gainsharing plans, but non-trivial levels of ignorance and 
false positive responses are observed for all of the plans. Probit analyses allow a comparison of 
middle-aged, highly-paid, well-educated, salaried workers to those that are younger, 
inexperienced, low-educated, and low-paid; the latter are significantly more likely to be unaware 
of or misunderstand the coverage of company and individual-based performance pay plans.  
Such shared capitalism programs seek to tie employee pay to performance. If this is 
intended simply as a risk-sharing mechanism between employers and their employees, then 
ignorance of shared capitalism plans is detrimental to employees, but is probably not a 
significant concern with respect to corporate performance. In contrast, if a goal of shared 
capitalism programs is to provide incentives for employee performance, then employee 
ignorance has the potential to undermine this goal. Put simply, how can incentives work if 
employees are not aware of their existence? For example, 37 percent of employees that their 
employers say are covered by individual-based incentives fail to perceive that they are in fact  
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covered by such an incentive plan. Other research shows that employees act upon their own 
imperfect information—Chan and Stevens (2004) found that misinformed individuals based their 
retirement decisions on their own, misinformed views of their pension wealth. These regression 
results for employee attitudes regarding their willingness to work hard and their loyalty to their 
employer are consistent with other research and further suggest that ignorance can undermine 
both the practice of shared capitalism programs, and the econometric estimation of their effects. 
With that said, the previous literature on employee ignorance reminds us that some 
caution is warranted. The figures reported here assume that the company-reported information is 
completely accurate for each individual employee. In some cases employees may have better 
information than their employers. But it’s difficult to imagine that this can explain away 
ignorance rates as large as 37 percent. Moreover, if employees are excluded from various 
compensation programs, this is most likely on the basis of tenure (if probationary employees are 
excluded) and job characteristics (such as certain occupations or unionized workers being 
excluded). But the probit results show that inaccuracies are also correlated with demographic 
characteristics and with whether an employee expects to work for the organization for a long 
time. The possibility exists that these characteristics are substituting for incomplete job-level 
controls in the econometric models, but to the extent that this is only partially true, these 
multivariate results suggest that at least some of the observed inaccuracies are due to 
misunderstandings and ignorance. The results on the fraction of negative responses that are 
explicitly “don’t know” (Table 2) and employee perceptions of imperfect levels of job-related 
information (Table 8) are also consistent with non-trivial amounts of employee ignorance. 
  In addition to employee ignorance, the analyses document significant numbers of false 
positive responses—that is, employees that believe they are covered by a shared capitalism  
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program when their employer states that they are not. This aspect of overall inaccuracy might not 
undermine the incentive intentions of shared capitalism if perception becomes reality: workers 
that believe they are covered by an incentive-based plan might act as if there are incentives, at 
least until they find out they were wrong. In fact, the results on false positives suggests that 
rhetoric has perhaps outpaced reality. False positive responses occur when employees 
overestimate the presence of pay-for-performance plans. The probit results show that workers 
who are lower paid, paid hourly, or unionized are particularly likely to overestimate the presence 
of pay-for-performance plans. In other words, these workers believe that they are covered by an 
incentive-based plan—perhaps based on contemporary rhetoric on the contingent employment 
relationship—even when they are not (at least not formally according to their employers). As 
such, there might be an opening for companies to increase the presence or formalization of pay-
for-performance plans among these workers. On the other hand, the false positive results are 
similar to the results on the lack of awareness of shared capitalism programs in revealing the 
complexity of informational issues for shared capitalism programs—significant numbers of 
employees differ from their employers in their understandings of critical issues pertaining to pay 
determination and, especially in the case of gainsharing plans, are covered by programs 
administered by local managers that the corporate-level human resources staff has difficulty 
monitoring. 
  The results of this paper are also important for researchers. The mismatches between 
employer and employee reports of shared capitalism programs represent a form of measurement 
error which can have the usual econometric problem: regression estimates of the effects of these 
programs on, for example, organizational performance, are likely biased toward zero and 
therefore underestimate the true potential of shared capitalism programs with perfect  
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information. Finally, not only can employee ignorance undermine both research on and the 
practice of shared capitalism, but it should also give pause to economists and others that continue 
to assume that workers have perfect information. Contemporary theories as well as private and 
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Employee-Level Coverage, Perceived Coverage, and Ignorance Rates of Shared Capitalism Programs
a 
   Mismatches 



















Profit-Sharing Plan (company-based 
performance pay) 
0.849 
[45,759]      
0.703 




[38,829]     
0.071 
[32,164]      
Gainsharing Plans (workgroup or 
departmental-based performance pay)               
0.028 
[45,759]      
0.211 




[1,261]      
0.933 
[9,645]      
Individual-Based Performance Pay                     0.291 
[45,759]      
0.282 




[13,319]     
0.354 
[12,908]      












Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP)  1.000
d 
[4,362]      
0.817 
[4,362]          
0.183 
[4,362]      
0.183 
[4,362]        
0.000 
[3,564] 
Source: NBER Shared Capitalism data set. 
Notes: 
a Sample sizes are in brackets. 
b Employees who do not perceive that they are covered when their employer says they are; sample limited to covered 
employees. 
c Employees who perceive that they are covered when their employer says they are not; sample limited to employees reporting 
that they are covered. 




Table 2  
Employees that Don’t Know about Shared Capitalism Programs 
  Fraction of Negative 
Responses that are  
“Don’t Know” 
Eligible for Performance-Based Pay  19.77 % 
(1,838 / 9,295) 
Received Performance-Based Bonuses Last Year  7.83 % 
(1,219 / 15,560) 
Participate in the ESOP  32.33 % 
(258 / 798) 
Participate in a 401(k) Plan  17.55 % 
(1,506 / 8,583) 
Ever Received Stock Options  14.02 % 
(89 / 635) 
Ever Exercised Stock Options, Currently Hold Stock Options, 
Participate in an Employee Stock Purchase Plan, or Bought 
Company Stock on the Open Market 
All < 1 % 





Probit Analyses of Employer-Employee Mismatches
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       continued  
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Table 3 (continued) 
Dep. Var. Mean  0.171  0.253  0.220  0.104 
Model χ
2 test p-value  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 
Sample Size  23,478  23,478  23,478  23,478 
Source: NBER Shared Capitalism data set. 
Notes: 
a Each entry contains the marginal effect and robust standard error (in parentheses) 
from a probit model where the dependent variable indicates employer-employee 
mismatches about the shared capitalism plan denoted in each column heading. 
b High school dropout is the omitted category for the two educational attainment 
variables. 





Probit Analyses of Employee Ignorance
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Table 4 (continued) 
Dep. Var. Mean  0.164  0.495  0.312  0.084  0.151 
Model χ
2 test p-value  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001  <0.0001 
Sample  Size  21,325 827  9,435 21,569 2,827 
Source: NBER Shared Capitalism data set. 
Notes: 
a Each entry contains the marginal effect and robust standard error (in parentheses) from 
a probit model where the dependent variable indicates employee ignorance about the 
shared capitalism plan denoted in each column heading. 
b High school dropout is the omitted category for the two educational attainment 
variables, except in column 2. 




Predicted Ignorance Rates for Different Employee Profiles 



















A single, 21 year-old, non-white, high school dropout father of 
two making $25,000 per year with no expectation of working 
for this company for a long time and one year of tenure 
working in a union-represented, non-sales, hourly job in the 





















A married, 45 year-old, white, college-educated, childless 
woman making $75,000 per year with expectations of working 
for this company for a long time with 15 years of tenure in a 
nonunion, non-sales, salaried job in the United States for a 
















Probit Analyses of False Positives
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Sales occupation   0.009* 
(0.003) 
0.015* 
(0.003)  --- --- 
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Table 6 (continued) 
Dep. Var. Mean  0.028  0.930  0.297  0.034 
Model χ
2 test p-value  <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001  <0.0001 
Sample Size  18,343  5,949  7,470  18,790 
Source: NBER Shared Capitalism data set. 
Notes: 
a Each entry contains the marginal effect and robust standard error (in parentheses) 
from a probit model where the dependent variable indicates an employee-reported 
false positive about the shared capitalism plan denoted in each column heading. 
b High school dropout is the omitted category for the two educational attainment 
variables, except in column 2 where high school dropouts are excluded from the 
sample. 




Predicted False Positive Rates for Different Employee Profiles 














Based Pay  
(4) 
A single, 21 year-old, non-white, high school dropout father of two 
making $25,000 per year with no expectation of working for this 
company for a long time and one year of tenure working in a union-
represented, non-sales, hourly job in the United States for a 

















A married, 45 year-old, white, college-educated, childless woman 
making $75,000 per year with expectations of working for this 
company for a long time with 15 years of tenure in a nonunion, non-














Other Measures of Employee Ignorance 
Question [survey pool] 
Response  





How frequently do you feel that the Company is reaching out to you to inform you 
(through meetings, newsletters, email or Internet) about the goals of the company, 
overall workplace performance, changes to workplace organization, or 




(735 / 2,575) 
 
 
How frequently do you reach out to inform yourself (through meetings you set up or 
conversations that you initiate or material you read, or use of the Internet or other 
means) about the goals of the company, overall workplace performance, changes to 




(747 / 1,699) 
    
I get the information I need to do my job. [1 company]  Strongly disagree, 
disagree, or do not know
26.94 % 
(7,999 / 29,689) 
    
We are kept informed of important issues in the organization. [1 company] Strongly  disagree, 
disagree, or do not know
45.46% 
(13,528 / 29,757) 
    
I am kept informed about changes affecting my work. [1 company]  Strongly disagree, 
disagree, or do not know
43.40 % 
(12,881 / 29,678) 
    
To what extent do you understand your company’s overall plan for being successful? 
[7 companies]  
Not at all or very little  14.76 % 
(4,981 / 33,747) 
Source: NBER Shared Capitalism data set.  
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Table 9 
Regression Analysis of the Effect of Performance-Based Pay on Work Attitudes 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable: Willingness to Work Hard
a 
Employee believes covered by any 






Employer-Employee Matched Responses for any performance-based pay plan 
 (Accurate No is omitted category) 













b No  No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.007 0.009 0.058 0.058 
Sample  Size  44,799 44,799 23,507 23,507 
      
Dependent Variable: Loyalty
c 
Employee believes covered by any 






Employer-Employee Matched Responses  
(Accurate No is omitted category) 













b No  No  Yes  Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.011 0.011 0.077 0.079 
Sample  Size  41,278 41,278 23,197 23,197  
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Notes to Table 9 
Source: NBER Shared Capitalism data set. 
Notes: 
a To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement?  “I am willing to 
work harder than I have to in order to help the company I work for succeed.” 
1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree (mean=4.02, standard deviation=0.899). 
b Controls for education, age, gender, marital status, children, tenure, fixed pay, 
hourly occupation, sales occupation, union status, and U.S. employee. 
c How much loyalty would you say you feel toward the company you work for as a 
whole? 1=no loyalty at all, 2=only a little, 3=some, 4=a lot (mean=3.33, standard 
deviation=0.798). 
*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Appendix Table 1 
Independent Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 Mean 
(standard deviation) 








Age of employee (years)  41.451 
(9.980) 
1 if employee is female  0.296 
(0.456) 
1 if employee’s race is nonwhite  0.189 
(0.392)  
1 if employee is currently married or living as married   0.746 
(0.435)  
Number of children under age 18  0.987 
(1.167) 
Years worked for current employer  9.226 
(8.661)  








1 if employee is paid by the hour   0.411 
(0.492) 




1 if employee is unionized   0.053 
(0.223)  
1 if employee works in the United States   0.890 
(0.312) 
Total number of employees for the company  
           
35,848.998 
(16,345.097) 
Source: NBER Shared Capitalism data set. 
Note: The sample statistics presented here are for the 23,478 observations that have complete 
information for the probit models in Table 3. 
 